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(Financial Accounting Standards Board) 
We analyze the link between financial reporting choices that affect accruals quality and firms’ use of call 
options.  We argue that call options used in compensation arrangements (employee stock options or 
ESOs) create countervailing incentives for managers to affect accruals quality.  On the one hand, poorer 
accruals quality is associated with greater returns volatility (which leads to an increase in ESO value); on 
the other hand, better accruals quality is associated with a lower cost of capital (and, therefore, higher 
share price, which leads to an increase in ESO value).  We confirm both effects on accruals quality, and 
we show that the net effect is for ESOs to worsen accruals quality.  We provide additional evidence on 
this main result by showing that in two settings where the returns volatility incentive to worsen accruals 
quality is muted or absent (cases where managers hold employer shares and cases where the firm uses call 
options for financing purposes, such as preferred stock and convertible debt), the overall incentive is for 
managers to increase accruals quality. 
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1.  Introduction
We examine the relation between accruals quality and the use of returns volatility sensitive and 
price sensitive instruments such as call options, which set up countervailing incentives with regard to 
accruals quality.  To see these incentives, note that a call option’s value is increasing in both returns 
volatility and stock price.  Further note that prior research shows that better accruals quality is associated
with decreased priced returns volatility (leading to lower costs of capital and therefore higher stock 
prices) and that poorer accruals quality is associated with greater total returns variability.
1  Decisions
which affect accruals quality will therefore be influenced by incentives to trade off the option valuation 
effects of a decreased cost of capital – that is, a higher stock price – with higher returns volatility. 
Our study exploits the fact that the strength of these two forces differs across call option 
instruments and across forms of compensation. In particular, when call options are used for 
compensation purposes (e.g., employee stock options or ESOs), both incentives exist and it is ex ante
unclear which dominates.  In contrast, when call options are used for financing purposes (convertible debt 
and convertible preferred stock), the incentive to increase returns volatility is absent because these 
convertible instruments provide managers with little or no opportunity to capture the valuation effects of 
increased returns volatility (because managers do not typically own these instruments).  Within the 
compensation setting, managerial shareholdings of employer shares heighten the price effect (and mute
the returns volatility effect) because such shareholdings create incentives for managers to increase stock 
price without creating incentives to increase returns volatility.
Our analyses differ from prior work on the incentive effects of call options in two ways.  First, 
prior research focuses on compensation arrangements, particularly ESOs, and has in general not 
1 Easley and O’Hara [2004] and Leuz and Verrecchia [2004] develop theoretical models of the relation between the
cost of capital and information risk; empirical research has shown that accruals quality captures elements of this risk
(Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper [2005, 2004a]). In addition, Francis, LaFond, Olsson and Schipper [2004b]
and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam [2004] document a significant positive association between accruals quality and 
idiosyncratic returns volatility. We confirm that these associations exist for our samples in section 3.3.
1considered financing arrangements.  Second, research has tended to examine either incentives to increase 
risk (and therefore returns volatility) or incentives to increase performance (and therefore stock price), but 
not both.  An exception is Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin [2004] who find some evidence that ESOs are 
associated with increased operating performance and with increased returns volatility.  Our paper is 
related in that we also consider an outcome measure, namely, financial reporting decisions as summarized
by accruals quality.  However, our outcome measure differs in that it is associated with both volatility-
increasing effects and price-increasing effects.  That is, ESOs create incentives both to increase accruals
quality and thereby increase stock price and to decrease accruals quality and thereby increase returns
volatility.  If the former effect dominates, then ESOs will be associated with overall better accruals 
quality and if the latter effect dominates, then the opposite will be true.
2
While our analyses focus on how accruals quality is affected by the use of call options for 
compensation and financing purposes, we view the use of call options and their reporting consequences as 
potentially endogenous and simultaneous decisions. Following prior research, we expect that accruals 
quality is influenced by call option incentives and vice versa (simultaneity), with a portion of both
constructs driven by a set of underlying factors (endogeneity).
Our tests require data on accruals quality, and on the use of call options for compensation 
purposes (ESOs) and for financing purposes (convertible debt and convertible preferred stock).  We 
measure total accruals quality (AQ), following McNichols’ [2002] modification of Dechow and Dichev 
[2002], as the standard deviation of the time-series of a firm’s residuals from a regression of working 
capital accruals on lagged, current and future cash flows, as well as change in revenues and property,
plant and equipment.  Larger standard deviations indicate greater uncertainty in accruals and, therefore, 
poorer accruals quality.  We control for the portion of total accruals quality that is driven by fundamentals 
associated with the business environment and its operating risks, because our predictions about 
managerial responses to the use of call options relate to the portion of accruals quality which managers
2 Because we focus on only the financial reporting effect of ESOs, we are not able to comment on whether the
aggregate effect of ESOs is costly or beneficial to shareholders.
2can influence by making accounting choices, judgments, estimates and implementation decisions within 
generally accepted accounting principles.  Our tests take discretionary accruals quality as a summary
indicator of the influence on financial reporting decisions of call option arrangements.
For several reasons, including the apparent sensitivity of results reported in previous research to
specification and design choices, we analyze two different ESO constructs, each with its own advantages
and disadvantages.  Our first measures, based on Execucomp data, capture ESO sensitivity to returns
volatility and to stock price for 1,182 firms over 1992-2002.  These measures are available only for the 
top five executives and are not available for call options used in financing arrangements, so for these tests 
we are not able to make comparisons between ESOs and convertible instruments.  For these tests we can, 
however, evaluate the effects of managerial shareholdings, which we expect to be associated with better 
accruals quality given that such shareholdings encourage reporting behaviors which increase share price.
Our second measures, based on Compustat data, capture the number of call options used in both
compensation and financing arrangements for 3,322 firms over 1984-1995.  These usage measures permit
direct comparisons between ESOs and convertible instruments, are not restricted to the top five
executives (but rather include all call options outstanding to the firm), and are available for a larger 
sample of firms.
3  However, these data are not available after 1995 and they do not take account of the 
separate sensitivities of option values to stock price and to returns volatility; further, data on managerial 
shareholdings are not readily available over this earlier time frame.
Our results generally conform to all predictions.  Analyses based on the ESO sensitivity measures
indicate that greater ESO sensitivity to returns volatility is associated with poorer accruals quality, and 
that greater ESO sensitivity to stock price is associated with better accruals quality; both results are 
significant at the 0.001 level.  Further tests show that the returns volatility effect of ESOs dominates the 
price effect, resulting in net poorer accruals quality.  In addition, we find that managerial shareholdings 
3 In particular, prior studies tend to either use hand-collected data for relatively small samples of firms (Guay [1999,
N=278 CEO’s in 1973]; Rajgopal and Shevlin [2002, N=121 CEOs in the oil and gas industry in 1998]; Cohen, Hall 
and Viceira [2000, N=478 firms in 1984]) or use a sub-sample of firms with data available on Execucomp (Hanlon,
Rajgopal and Shevlin [2003]; Coles, Daniel and Naveen [2003]; Li [2004]).
3are associated with better accruals quality, consistent with such shareholdings creating incentives for 
managers to take financing reporting actions which improve accruals quality and thereby increase share
price.  Analyses based on the option usage measures indicate that greater use of ESOs is also associated
with net poorer accruals quality, and that this relation is more pronounced for firms with stronger 
mappings of accruals quality into returns volatility; both results are significant at the 0.001 level.  Results 
for convertible instruments show that greater use of convertible debt and convertible preferred stock is 
associated with better accruals quality, consistent with these instruments providing managers with no 
incentive to increase returns volatility and therefore to worsen accruals quality.
In summary, we find that managers trade off call option based incentives for both poorer and 
better accruals quality. The overall financial reporting effect of using call options in compensation
arrangements is a decrease in accruals quality, while the overall financial reporting effect of using call 
options in financing arrangements is an increase in accruals quality.  Further tests show some evidence
that overall lower accruals quality elicits decreased use of call options in compensation arrangements; in 
contrast, we find increased use of convertible instruments in response to better accruals quality.
We also provide estimates of the benefits to the manager and the cost to the firm of the poorer 
accruals quality associated with ESOs.  For our samples, we estimate the average top five managers’ ESO 
portfolio value increases by about $91,000 (or about 6% of his annual total compensation and about 17%
of his salary plus bonus). For the firm, the poorer accruals quality effect of ESOs translates into a cost of 
capital premium of about 29-210 basis points.  The latter estimate does not imply that firms are 
destroying value by using ESOs, since the use of ESOs also likely results in benefits which are not 
captured by our tests (such as, for example, new products and increased profitability).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 motivates our hypotheses in the context
of related work.  Section 3 describes the data and samples, and provides evidence on a maintained 
assumption: that accruals quality is associated with greater returns volatility.  Section 4 presents the 
results, and section 5 concludes.
42. Hypothesis Development
2.1. Association between the use of call options in compensation arrangements and accruals quality.
Our analyses build on previous research that considers volatility-based and share-price-based 
incentive effects associated with the use of call options in compensation arrangements.  With regard to the 
former, researchers have taken the view that ESOs primarily induce desirable increases in volatility
because they motivate risk-averse managers to choose high risk (volatility increasing) projects that 
presumably have positive net present values (e.g., Lambert [1986], Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia
[1991], Hemmer, Kim and Verrecchia [1999], Guay [1999] and Ittner, Lambert and Larcker [2003]).
Direct tests of this proposition, focusing on project selection, are found for the oil and gas industry
(Rajgopal and Shevlin [2002]), the gold industry (Tufano [1996]), merger and acquisition activity (Li 
[2004]; Agrawal and Mandelker [1987]) and research and development investments (Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen [2003]).  Other tests have examined broader measures of the outcome of risky project selection, 
documenting positive associations between ESO risk incentives and contemporaneous returns volatility
(Guay [1999]), subsequent returns volatility (Cohen, Hall and Viceria [2003]), and subsequent cash flow 
and earnings volatility (Hanlon, Rajgopal and Shevlin [2004]).
  With regard to share-price-based incentives, research has considered whether ESOs provide 
incentives to increase stock price (or income, a major determinant of stock price).  For example, Hanlon, 
Rajgopal and Shevlin [2003] report that ESOs are associated with increased operating income, although
this result is sensitive to specification and other design choices (Larcker [2003]).  A variant of this
research takes the view that ESOs create incentives for apparent increased performance, that is,
incentives to manage earnings so as to manipulate share prices higher (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram
[2004], Cohen, Dey and Lys [2004] and Ke [2004]).
Tests of the extent to which ESOs create incentives for managers to undertake high-risk projects
(or to increase share price) are predicated on the view that managers have access to mechanisms for 
increasing returns volatility (or for improving performance).  Building on previous research that
documents these associations, we posit that managers’ access to financial reporting decisions is a 
5mechanism for increasing returns volatility via poorer accruals quality, and for increasing stock price via 
better accruals quality through a reduction in the cost of capital. We argue that managers trade off 
incentives to make financial reporting decisions that decrease accruals quality (and, by implication,
increase returns volatility) and increase accruals quality (and, by implication, increase share price).  It is 
an empirical question which effect is stronger.
In addition, following Rajgopal and Shevlin’s [2002] analysis of the endogenous relation between 
risk incentives and ESOs in oil and gas firms, we view both accruals quality and option use as choice 
variables, endogenously determined.  In our setting, we predict that discretionary accruals quality—as a 
managerial choice mechanism that affects returns volatility—is affected by the use of ESOs. Because this
relation is both simultaneous and endogenous with governance decisions about ESO usage, we allow for a 
governance response to the accruals quality effects of ESOs.  By governance response we mean that 
accruals quality potentially affects boards of directors’ decisions about ESOs.  In the case of the ESO 
sensitivity measure, we predict either no governance response to poorer accruals quality associated with 
greater ESO sensitivity to returns volatility or a response that decreases ESO sensitivity to returns 
volatility.  The latter response, which mutes the change in ESO value as a function of accruals quality,
might create incentives to decrease accruals quality even further, so as to obtain the same overall effect on 
option values.  In the case of the ESO usage measure, our review of the literature suggests two possible 
governance responses.  On the one hand, Ittner et al.’s [2003] evaluation risk argument suggests that firms 
with poor accruals quality will use ESOs less intensively because, for such firms, returns are a noisy
measure of performance, causing employees to resist ESOs.  We would also predict diminished use of 
ESOs in response to the portion of the firm’s accruals quality driven by managers’ discretionary behavior
that reduces accruals quality (since poorer accruals quality raises the cost of capital).  On the other hand, 
Bushman, Chen, Engle and Smith [2004] argue that firms with poor information quality will use more
equity-based incentives to align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders; this argument suggests 
that firms with poorer accruals quality will use ESOs more intensively.  Given these conflicting 
arguments, we make no prediction as to firms’ ESO response to actions which worsen accruals quality.
6Our hypotheses about the financial reporting incentive effects of ESOs and the governance 
responses, stated in null form, are as follows: 
H1a: Accruals quality is unrelated to ESO sensitivity or ESO use. 
H1b: There is no governance response, in the form of greater or lesser ESO sensitivity or ESO 
use, to accruals quality.
Based on the previous reasoning, the alternatives to the null hypotheses are two sided.  The two elements
of H1 are tested using the following general system of equations, where the “Accruals quality” equation
models factors influencing accruals quality (H1a), and the “Governance response” equation models
factors affecting the firm’s response to the accruals quality implications of ESOs (H1b):
Accruals quality: 01 j jk j AQ ESO j J JO     Innate(k) H
Governance response: 
01 2 3 4 5
67 8 log( )
j jj j j
jj j j
j ESO AQ IOS FCF DivConstraint Volatility
Assets Tax Regulated
II I I I I
II I K
     
  
where j AQ = the firm’s accruals quality, where larger values of AQ indicate poorer quality;
j ESO  = measure of the firm’s ESO sensitivity or ESO usage; 
 = a vector of variables capturing economic fundamentals influencing accruals quality. Innate(k)
As described in the Introduction, we use two measures of the ESO construct.  The first measure,
following Core and Guay [2002], captures the risk sensitivity of ESOs as the change in the Black-Scholes
value of the average of the top five executives ESO portfolio to a 0.01 change in returns volatility,
RiskSens.  We also calculate the price sensitivity of ESOs as the sensitivity of the top five executive ESO 
portfolio to a 1% change in stock price, PriceSens.  Using separate measures of risk sensitivity and price 
sensitivity has the advantage of allowing us to evaluate the separate and predicted opposite effects of 
these sensitivity measures on accruals quality.  In particular, RiskSens captures the positive effect on 
option values that comes from an increase in total volatility as a consequence of poorer accruals quality,
while PriceSens captures the positive effect on option values that comes from an increase in stock price as 
a result of better accruals quality.  The second measure, following Dechow, Hutton and Sloan [1996],
7captures ESO usage as the fraction of total shares outstanding reserved for ESO exercise, ESO Usage.
This measure captures the net effect of the two countervailing forces: poorer accruals quality increases
total returns volatility (leading to an increase in option values) and better accruals quality decreases 
priced returns volatility (leading to higher future stock prices and, therefore, higher option values).
Our main tests concern the coefficients on the endogenous variables in each equation: the ESO
measure in the Accruals quality equation and AQ in the Governance response equation.  H1a pertains to 
the relation between the ESO measure and incentives for managers to influence accruals quality; these 
behaviors are captured by the coefficient 1 J .  For the ESO sensitivity measures, the specific system of 
equations that we estimate is given by equations (1) and (2): 
Accruals quality:
01 2 3 j jj j k j AQ RiskSens log(PriceSens) log(MgrlHoldings) j J JJ J O H       Innate(k)   (1) 
Governance response:
01 2 3 4 5
67 8
j jj j j
jj j j
j RiskSens AQ IOS FCF DivConstraint Volatility
log(Assets) Tax Regulated
II I I I I
II I K
     
  
   (2)
We argue that managers compensated with call options have incentives to make financial 
reporting decisions that decrease accruals quality because poorer accruals quality translates into greater 
returns volatility which increases option value.  Since this incentive is greater the more sensitive is option 
value to returns volatility (i.e., larger values of RiskSens), we predict  1 0 J ! .  The price effect has the
opposite prediction: ESOs which are more sensitive to stock price (i.e., larger values of PriceSens)
encourage managers to make financial reporting decisions that improve accruals quality, or 2 0 J  . Our
tests use the log transformation of PriceSens because this variable is skewed and because the 
untransformed value of PriceSens is highly correlated with RiskSens;
4 transforming the variable mitigates
both concerns.  (We note, however, that we draw similar inferences using the untransformed variable.)
We describe the prediction related to the MgrlHoldings variable in section 2.2. 
4 The correlation between PriceSens and RiskSens is expected, given that the two variables share several common
inputs.  To see this overlap, we refer the reader to Core and Guay [2002, Appendix A].
8Turning to equation (2), the coefficient on AQ, 1 I , captures the board of directors’ response to the
accruals quality effects of ESO risk sensitivity.
 5  A finding that  1 0 I   suggests reduced ESO risk 
sensitivity in firms with poorer total accruals quality. On the other hand, a finding that  0 1 ! I  suggests 
that overall poorer accruals quality elicits the use of ESOs with greater risk sensitivity.
In each equation, we include proxies for other factors believed to influence the respective 
dependent variable.  Equation (1) includes variables capturing economic fundamentals that influence the 
innate or intrinsic portion of accruals quality, Innate(k).  By including these variables as controls, we can 
interpret 1 J  as capturing the ESO effect on the portion of AQ that is not explained by these innate factors.
That is,  1 J  captures the ESO effect on financial reporting decisions that influence discretionary accruals
quality.
6  We proxy for the innate portion of accruals quality using the variables put forward by Dechow 
and Dichev [2002] as capturing business and operating risk: firm size (log(Assets)), standard deviation of 
cash flow from operations and sales ( ( ) CFO V and ( ) Sales V ), length of operating cycle (l ,




Equation (2) includes factors shown by previous research to affect the risk sensitivity or use of
ESOs: investment opportunities, free cash flows, dividend constraints, noise in returns, size, taxes, and 
regulation (Smith and Watts [1992], Gaver and Gaver [1993], Sloan [1993], Matsunaga [1995], Dechow 
et al. [1996], Ittner et al. [2003]).  Following Guay [1999], we proxy for the investment opportunity set 
using the common factor score obtained from factor analysis of three variables: research and development
5 Following Hanlon et al.,we do not set up a separate equation to endogenize price sensitivity.  In sensitivity tests, 
Hausman tests (not reported) confirm that log(PriceSens) is not endogenous with RiskSens (p-value is 0.7020) or
with AQ (p-value is 0.9189).
6 Ideally, the dependent variable in the Accruals quality regression would be a measure of discretionary accruals
quality (rather than total accruals quality, AQ) and we would not include Innate(k) as independent variables.
However, because the determinants of discretionary accruals quality are not well-understood, the explanatory power
of regressions based on measures of discretionary accruals quality is low.  In particular, using a measure of 
discretionary accruals quality, DiscAQ, formed by orthogonalizing AQ with respect to its innate factors (see Francis
et al. [2005]), we are able to explain only 6.7% of the variation in DiscAQ in a first stage regression. (In contrast,
the first-stage regression based on AQ has an explanatory power of 45%-65%.)  In section 4.3 we describe the
results of a sensitivity analysis probing this issue.
9expense to total assets, book-to-market ratio, and capital investment expenditures as a percentage of total 
assets.  We proxy for cash constraints using free cash flow, defined as cash from operations less capital 
expenditures scaled by total assets (FCF), and using Dechow et al.’s [1996] measure of the firm’s
closeness to dividend constraints, DivConstraint (equal to one if the ratio (retained earnings plus cash 
dividends and stock repurchases)/(cash dividends plus stock repurchases) is less than two, zero 
otherwise).  We measure returns volatility as the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns in 
year t, Volatility.
7  Finally, we include variables capturing firm size, tax status, and regulatory
environment based on prior researchers’ findings that these variables also influence ESO use.
8  Firm size 
is measured as the log of total assets in year t.  The firm’s tax position is captured by an indicator
variable, equal to one if the firm has any net operating loss carry forwards in year t, and zero otherwise 
(Tax).  We include a dummy variable for whether the firm operates in a regulated industry, defined as 2-
digit SIC codes 49, 60, 62, 64-67 (Regulated).
2.2 Settings which offer no returns volatility incentives to worsen accruals quality
We calibrate our analyses of volatility incentives to worsen accruals quality by considering two 
settings where we expect this incentive to be muted or absent entirely.  In the first setting (involving our 
tests of RiskSens), we include a measure of managerial shareholdings, MgrlHoldings.  The argument here 
is that managers with more wealth concentrated in employer stock have greater incentives to increase
stock price.  In our setting, this incentive translates into actions which improve accruals quality, because 
better accruals quality reduces the cost of capital and thereby increases share price.  We predict, therefore, 
that the coefficient on the managerial holdings variable in equation (1) is negative ( 3 0 J  ).
7 Some prior studies measure returns variability as the proportion of the variation in the firm’s daily stock returns in 
year t that is not attributable to market movements (e.g., Matsunaga [1995], Dechow, Hutton and Sloan [1996]).
Since the explained variability from firm-specific market model (CAPM) estimations on daily returns data tends to
be low, this measure tends to be close to one for most firms.
8 Matsunaga [1995] also reports that financial leverage is positively associated with options use (where the latter is 
measured by an indicator variable, equal to one if the firm granted stock options in year t, and zero otherwise).
However, using the same measure of stock option usage that we use, Dechow et al. [1996] find no significant
relation between ESO and leverage.  Rajgopal and Shevlin do not include leverage in the regression capturing the
use of risk-based incentives. In unreported tests, we find that the inclusion of financial leverage results in
statistically insignificant leverage coefficients and has no effect on our inferences.
10In the second setting (involving our tests of ESO Usage), we include two measures of call option 
usage in financing arrangements: convertible debt and convertible preferred stock.
9  For these convertible 
instruments, the benefit of returns volatility is the premium received by the firm at issuance in the form of 
a lower required yield on the host instrument (Billingsley, Lamy, Marr and Thompson [1985]).  After 
issuance, convertible instruments do not provide incentives for managers to increase volatility, because all 
the benefits of doing so accrue to the holders of the instruments who are not, by and large, managers.
Consequently, we expect that greater use of convertible debt and convertible preferred stock will not be 
associated with poorer accruals quality. Moreover, to the extent managers are concerned about the cost of 
capital, and perhaps specifically about the costs of subsequent capital-raising, the use of convertible
instruments will encourage improvements in accruals quality.  The same prediction is generated by an 
argument that managers have post-issuance incentives to expropriate wealth from convertible debt and 
preferred stock holders in ways that benefit shareholders (e.g., Jensen and Meckling [1976]).
Because firms that use call options in compensation arrangements are likely to use them in 
financing arrangements (and vice versa), and firms that use convertible debt are likely to use convertible
preferred stock (and vice versa), our tests of option usage measures simultaneously examine the effects of 
the three option instruments, by estimating the following system of four equations:
Accruals quality:
01 2 3 j jjj k AQ ESO Usage ConvDebt Usage ConvPref Usage jj J JJ J O       Innate(k) H       (3) 
ESO usage governance response: 
01 2 3 4 5
(4 )
67 8 log( )
j jj j j
a
jj j j
j ESO Usage AQ IOS FCF DivConstraint Volatility
Assets Tax Regulated
I II I I I
II I K
     
  
      (4a) 
9 Finance research has examined determinants of the choice between convertible instruments and nonconvertible
debt or equity, as opposed to the incentive properties of these instruments. For example, Green [1984] argues that
convertible debt is a substitute for straight debt that reduces costs associated with bondholder-stockholder conflicts.
In contrast, Stein [1992] argues that convertible debt is a substitute for equity because the conversion option
provides indirect equity financing without the adverse selection costs of equity.  Mayers [1998] also argues that
convertible debt economizes on issuance costs and solves the over-investment problem when a firm needs financing
for both an initial project in place and a follow-on project whose payoff is uncertain.
11Convertible debt usage governance response:
01 2 3 4 5
(4 )
67 8 log( )
j jj j j
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     (4b) 
Convertible preferred stock usage governance response: 
01 2 3 4 5
(4 )
67 8 log( )
j jj j j j
c
jj j j
ConvPref Usage AQ IOS FCF DivConstraint Volatility
Assets Tax Regulated
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     
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     (4c) 
Equation (3) examines the marginal effects on accruals quality of each instrument, controlling for 
the effects of the others.  If ESOs encourage poor (good) accruals quality, the coefficient on ESO Usage,
1 J , is expected to be positive (negative); note that  1 J  captures the combined effect of managerial
incentives to increase and decrease accruals quality. In contrast, we expect that call options in convertible 
instruments offer no incentive to worsen accruals quality and hence, predict zero or negative coefficients 
on ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage ( 23 0a n d 0 J J dd ).  The response equations (4a)-(4c) assume
that the determinants of ESO use are the same as the determinants of convertible instrument use; these 
equations also allow for convertible instruments and accruals quality to be endogenously determined.
Concerning the first point, our reading of the literature suggests that the determinants of ESO Usage are 
broadly consistent with those explaining convertible debt usage.
10  Concerning the second point, it is not 
obvious whether an endogenous relation exists between convertible instruments and accruals quality, or if
one exists, whether it is similar to that between ESO Usage and AQ.  On the one hand, poorer total 
accruals quality will increase returns volatility and therefore the premium on call options embedded in 
debt and preferred stock, so serial issuers of these instruments have incentives to decrease accruals
quality.  On the other hand, better total accruals quality will decrease the overall costs of debt and equity
10 In particular, Essig [1991] documents that convertible debt use is positively related to R&D spending and market
to book ratios (consistent with greater use of convertible debt by firms with larger investment opportunities) and
Essig [1991] and Brennan and Schwartz [1988] find that convertible debt use is increasing in risk (consistent with
convertible debt being used more by firms with noisier and more volatile returns). Other studies also investigate
whether variables related to cash constraints, firm size, tax position and dividend payouts affect convertible debt use
(e.g., Billingsley, Lamy and Thompson [1988]; Lewis, Rogalski and Seward [1999]; Lee and Figlewicz [1999]).
12capital.  Given these conflicting arguments, we do not predict the direction of any governance response to 
differences in accruals quality associated with convertible instruments.
3.  Sample and Descriptive Data 
3.1  Variable definitions and measurement.  Our tests require measures of accruals quality, ESO risk and 
price sensitivity, managerial shareholdings, and ESO, convertible debt and convertible preferred stock 
usage.  These measures are described below. 
Accruals quality.  We measure accruals quality based on McNichols’ [2002] modification of 
Dechow and Dichev’s [2002] model which separates accruals based on their association with cash flows 
by regressing working capital accruals on cash from operations in the current, prior, and future periods, as 
well as the change in revenues and property, plant and equipment (Compustat data item numbers are 
reported in parentheses):
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,, , , ,
jt jt jt jt jt jt
jj j j j j
jt jt jt jt jt jt
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() jt jt jt jt jt CA CL Cash STDEBT DEPN ' ' '  '  t j CA ,
     (5) 
where = firm j’s total current accruals in year t,  ;
= firm j’s average total assets (#6) in year t and t-1;  = firm j’s cash flow from operations 
in year t; ; = firm j’s total accruals in year t, measured as
;
t j TCA , ,, , () jt jt jt jt CA CL Cash STDEBT   ' ' ' '
, jt Assets t j CFO ,
t j t j t j TA NIBE CFO , , ,    t j TA ,
,, , , , '  = firm j’s change in current assets (#4)
between year t-1 and year t;   = firm j’s change in current liabilities (#5) between year t-1 and year
t;  = firm j’s change in cash (#1) between year t-1 and year t; 
t j CL , '
t j Cash , ' t j STDEBT , '  =  firm j’s change in
debt included in current liabilities (#34) between year t-1 and year t;  = firm j’s depreciation and 
amortization expense (#14) in year t;  = firm j’s net income before extraordinary items (#18) in 
year t; 
t j DEPN ,
t j NIBE ,
, jt Rev ' = firm j’s change in revenues (#12) between year t-1 and year t;  = firm j’s gross 
value of property, plant and equipment (#7) in year t. 
t j PPE ,
13The unexplained portion of the variation in working capital accruals is an inverse measure of 
accruals quality; that is, a greater unexplained portion implies lower quality.  Our measure of this 
unexplained variation is , ˆ () j jt AQ VQ   . We estimate (5) for each firm to yield a series of firm- and year-
specific residuals.  We require a firm to have at least five residuals to calculate the standard deviation; this
requirement implicitly constrains the sample to firms with at least seven yearly observations.  The 
estimation periods are aligned with the time periods covered by our two samples; that is, we estimate 
separate AQ measures for the 1992-2002 period (for tests that use RiskSens) and for the 1984-1995 period 
(for tests that use ESO Usage), allowing for a one year lead and lag for both estimations.
Risk sensitivity and price sensitivity. We collect data from Execucomp for new option grants,
unexercisable options, exercisable options, and returns volatility for all covered firms over the period 
1992-2002. We follow Core and Guay’s [2002] procedures to calculate RiskSens (the sensitivity of the
Black-Scholes value of an executive’s option portfolio to a 0.01 change in stock return volatility) and 
PriceSens (the sensitivity of the value of an ESO portfolio to a 1% change in stock price).  We average 
the sensitivity measures across the top five executives in each firm, to yield firm- and year-specific
measures of option sensitivity.  (In unreported tests, we find similar results if we restrict attention to the
chief executive officer’s ESOs).  To avoid overstating significance levels from pooling dependent 
observations across years, we calculate the average value of the annual sensitivity measures over 1992-
2002, yielding firm-specific measures. The ESO sensitivity sample contains 1,182 firms with data on 
RiskSens, PriceSens, AQ and all control variables.
Managerial shareholdings. Our measure of managerial shareholdings, MgrlHoldings, is the ratio 
of the market value of total employer shareholdings (valued at end of year share price) for the top five 
executives to their total current compensation (including salary, bonus, and the fair value of option or
stock grants during the year).  This ratio indicates how much of top managers’ wealth is concentrated in 
the employer’s shares, which we interpret as a measure of the importance to the manager of his employer
shareholdings.  Our tests use the log transformation of MgrlHoldings because this variable is highly
14skewed; because some managers in our sample have zero holdings, we add one to MgrlHoldings before 
calculating the log of this variable.  Data are obtained from Execucomp and, similar to the sensitivity
measures, are averaged over 1992-2002 to yield a firm-specific measure of managerial holdings.
Call option usage.  Our measure of ESO usage is based on Compustat data on common shares 
reserved for exercise of stock options (#215) and includes shares reserved for stock options outstanding
and options available for future grants. These data are reported for fiscal years ending prior to August 22,
1996.  We begin the sample in 1984 when a sufficient number of firms provided information on the 
common share conversion of their convertible instruments.  Following Dechow, Hutton and Sloan [1996],
we scale the number of common shares reserved for conversion by the total common shares outstanding 
at year end to obtain our measure of ESO usage (ESO Usage).  Because this measure is not denominated
in dollars or as a percentage of market value, any association we detect between it and risk-taking
behaviors (such as actions taken to reduce accruals quality) cannot be driven by returns volatility
mechanically affecting the fair value of ESOs.  To measure convertible debt and convertible preferred
stock usage we use common shares reserved for the conversion of convertible preferred stock (#203) and 
convertible debt (#200), respectively.  These data indicate the maximum number of common shares that 
would be issued if all convertible preferred stock (convertible debt) were converted into common stock.
As with ESO Usage, we standardize by the number of common shares outstanding to obtain our measures
of convertible debt usage (ConvDebt Usage) and convertible preferred stock usage (ConvPref Usage).
For the option usage tests, we exclude observations where values of all of the call option 
instruments are reported as missing on Compustat; that is, we require firms to have non-missing values of 
at least one of the instruments.  Only 159 firms have missing values for all instruments; including these 
firms in our tests and setting their missing values to zero has no affect on our inferences.  Similar to our 
tests of RiskSens, we collapse our panel data for 1984-1995 into a single (average) observation for each 
firm.  The option usage sample consists of 3,322 firms with data on the usage measures, AQ, and all 
control variables.
153.2. Sample and descriptive statistics
Descriptive data about the ESO sensitivity sample and the option usage sample are reported in 
Table 1, panels A and B, respectively. As shown in panel A, the mean [median] RiskSens for the option
sensitivity sample is 0.0293 [0.0145] and the mean [median] PriceSens is 0.0655 [0.0282]. In dollar 
terms, these sensitivities imply returns volatility incentives of $29,300 [$14,500] and share price 
incentives of $65,500 [$28,200].  These incentive effects are similar to those documented by Hanlon et 
al., who report returns volatility incentives for their sample of $32,000 [$14,000] and share price 
incentives of $81,000 [$29,000].  Data on MgrlHoldings indicate that managerial holdings represent 39.5 
times [2.1 times] the manager’s annual compensation. As shown in panel B, firms in the usage sample
have stock options which, if exercised, would amount to 8.51% [6.97%] of total shares outstanding; 
comparable measures for convertible debt and convertible preferred are 2.39% [0%] and 2.10% [0%],
respectively.
11  Table 1 also provides information on control variables.  Given that Execucomp’s coverage 
is tilted toward larger firms, it is not surprising that the ESO sensitivity sample firms are larger (as
measured by total assets), less volatile (as measured by returns volatility and by the standard deviations of 
cash flows and sales), and more profitable (as indicated by fewer loss realizations, larger free cash flows, 
and a smaller incidence of dividend constraints) than firms in the option usage sample.
We also report summary information about the AQ distribution.  The ESO sensitivity sample
firms have, on average, better accruals quality than the usage sample firms, as indicated by a mean
[median] value of AQ of 0.0177 [0.0132] versus 0.0346 [0.0225] for the options usage sample.  This 
result is to be expected, given that the ESO sensitivity sample firms are larger, less volatile,and have
shorter operating cycles than the option usage sample firms, and Dechow and Dichev show that these 
factors are associated with smaller values of AQ (i.e., higher accruals quality).  As benchmarks, Francis et 
al. [2005] report a mean value of AQ of 0.0442 and Rajgopal and Venkatachalam [2004] report 0.0447.
11 A few Compustat observations show extreme values of ESO’s, convertible debt and convertible preferred stock
(up to 293 times the number of shares of outstanding common stock). To mitigate the effects of extreme values, we
winsorize these variables at the 99
th percentile.
16In unreported analyses, we examine the industry distributions of both samples.  Neither sample
displays any meaningful clustering (the largest industry comprises only 7% of one of the samples).  As 
we report in sensitivity tests (section 4.3), our findings are also unaffected by including industry dummy
variables in all regressions. 
3.3. The relation between accrual quality and returns volatility, and between accruals quality and 
managerial incentives
Our hypotheses are predicated on two assumptions.  The first is that accruals quality is positively
correlated with returns volatility.  The second is that the incentives we hypothesize to affect managers’
ESO portfolios are sufficiently strong such they can reasonably be expected to influence managers’
reporting behaviors.  In this section, we provide evidence on the validity of both assumptions.
In terms of the first assumption, recall that our predictions require that actions taken to reduce
(increase) accruals quality lead to increases (decreases) in returns volatility.  Support for a relation 
between accruals quality and priced returns volatility for broad samples of firms is provided by Francis, 
LaFond, Olsson and Schipper [2005], who find that accruals quality is priced separately from other 
factors known to be associated with the variance of returns: beta, book-to-market and size.  Support for a 
relation between accruals quality and total returns volatility for broad samples of firms is reported by 
Rajgopal and Venkatachlam [2004] and by Francis et al. [2004b]. Both relations also hold for our two 
samples: for the ESO sensitivity sample (n=1,182 firms), the correlation between Volatility and AQ is 
0.5457 (Pearson) and 0.5269 (Spearman); for the option usage sample (n=3,322 firms), the correlations 
are 0.4340 and 0.5854.  All correlations are significant at the 0.0001 level.  To assess whether accruals 
quality is associated with returns volatility conditional on the presence of known risk factors, we regress 
Volatility on AQ, controlling for beta, size, and book-to-market.  We measure systematic risk as the slope 
coefficient from firm-specific CAPM regressions ( , j t Beta ), size is the year-end market value of equity 
( , j t MVE ), and the book-to-market ratio ( , j t BM ) is the ratio of the firm’s year-end book value of equity to
its year-end market value of equity, and.  Results (not reported) show that Volatility is positively 
17correlated with beta, negatively correlated with size and insignificantly associated with book-to-market.
Controlling for these factors, AQ is highly significant, with t-statistics of 10 or higher.  Together, these 
results demonstrate that accruals quality has a meaningful relation with returns volatility that is distinct 
from the link between volatility and other priced factors. 
In terms of the second assumption, we use information about the distributions of our variables to 
calculate estimates of the wealth effect, to the manager, of taking actions to influence accruals quality.
We begin by noting that Francis et al. [2004, Table 3, Panel A] report that the 10
th (90
th ) percentile values 
of their AQ distribution is 0.006 (0.055); we infer from these data that each decile adds an average of 
about 0.0061 [or (0.055-0.006)/8 deciles] in terms of AQ.  Because their findings are calibrated in terms 
of decile effects, we ask what happens to the manager’s ESO value from taking financial reporting actions
which worsen AQ by 0.0061 (i.e., by one decile)?
The effect on ESO value is a function of both the price effect and the returns volatility effect.  For 
the price effect, we know from Francis et al. [2004, Table 5] that a one decile change in AQ is associated
with an (annualized) cost of capital increment of 29 basis points, or a decrease in price of 0.29%.  We also 
know that the average effect on ESO value of a 1% decrease in price for our sample is $65,500 (mean
value of PriceSens from Table 1, Panel A).  The average price sensitivity effect on ESO value of a 0.0061 
increment in AQ is, therefore,  .  To calculate the risk sensitivity effect on 
ESO value from a 0.0061 increase in AQ, we require a measure of the volatility effect of a change in AQ,
which we estimate by regressing Volatility on AQ.  The slope coefficient from this regression is 6.1536 (t-
statistic = 22.87), and implies that a one unit change in AQ yields a 6.1536 unit change in returns
volatility.  An increase in AQ of 0.0061 would, therefore, result in an increase in returns volatility of 
0.0375 = 6.1536*0.0061. To determine the dollar effect of an increase of 0.0375 in returns volatility, note 
that Core and Guay [2002] define RiskSens as 
$19,000 0.29 ( $65,500)   u 
( / )*0.01 ESO Value Volatility ww .  Given that the average 
value of RiskSens in our sample is $29,300 (Table 1, Panel A), 0.0375 units of returns volatility translate 
18into an average effect of $110,000 on ESO value.  The overall effect of a 0.0061 change in AQ is the net 
of the returns volatility and share price effects, or approximately $91,000 = $110,000 - $19,000.
The $91,000 estimate is conditional on a change in AQ of 0.0061. The actual change in AQ
resulting from ESO incentives could be higher or lower than 0.0061; if higher (lower), the $91,000
estimate is too low (too high).  Because the actual change in AQ from ESO sensitivity is estimated by
equation (1), we defer discussion of the actual effect on managerial wealth until we discuss those results. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Tests of ESO sensitivity measures
Results of estimating equations (1) and (2) using two stage least squares (2SLS) are reported in 
Table 2, Panel A.  All tests control for outliers by deleting observations with studentized residuals greater 
than three in absolute value; inferences are not sensitive to whether or how we treat extreme observations.
The first-stage R
2s from both the AQ regression and the RiskSens regression are 0.4487 and 0.6575,
respectively, indicating that the estimates used in the second stage are reasonable proxies for the original 
values of the dependent variables. Hausman [1978] tests indicate that while RiskSens is endogenous to 
AQ (p-value = 0.0000), the opposite is not true (p-value = 0.8523).  The main results show: (i) a positive 
coefficient on RiskSens ( 1 0.7442 J   , t-statistic = 6.02) consistent with the prediction that increased ESO 
sensitivity to returns volatility is associated with financial reporting choices that reduce accruals quality;
and (ii) a negative coefficient on log(PriceSens) ( 2 0.0096 J   , t-statistic = -5.21) consistent with 
increased ESO sensitivity to share price being associated with financial reporting choices that improve
accruals quality.  We also find a negative coefficient on log(MgrlHoldings) ( 3 0.0006 J    , t-statistic = -
2.47), consistent with the prediction that compensation arrangements that provide incentives to increase
share price but not returns volatility are associated with better accruals quality. Finally, results of 
estimating equation (2) show no reliable evidence of a governance response to the poor accruals quality
associated with greater option sensitivity ( 1 0.1599 I   , t-statistic = 1.46).
19Given the dependence between risk sensitivity and price sensitivity (see footnote 4), we also 
estimate equations (1) and (2) excluding log(PriceSens);
12 results are shown in Table 2, Panel B.  As 
expected, the coefficient estimate on RiskSens ( 1 0.2055 J   , t-statistic = 7.93) declines in magnitude
because it now captures the net effect of both risk sensitivity and price sensitivity.  The smaller but still 
positive point estimate for  1 J  is consistent with the returns-volatility effect dominating the price effect,
such that poorer accruals quality prevails.  The coefficient on log(MgrlHoldings) remains reliably
negative ( 3 0.0005 J   , t-statistic = -2.43).
 Using these results, we can now compute the change in AQ associated with the risk sensitivity 
and price sensitivity effects.  Recall that our analysis showed that managers’ ESO values increased by
about $91,000 from reducing accruals quality by 0.0061.  We extend this analysis by noting that the 
product of the mean value of RiskSens (0.0293, Table 1, panel A) and the coefficient estimate on 
RiskSens, 1 0.2055 J    (which captures the net effect as reported in Table 2, Panel B), provides an 
estimate of the total change in discretionary AQ.  Multiplying these figures indicates that the average 
effect of ESO incentives is to increase AQ by 0.0060, or roughly the same magnitude as a one decile 
change in AQ (of 0.0061) which we showed in section 3.3 is associated with about a $91,000 increase in 
ESO value.  To put this figure in perspective, for the average manager in our sample, $91,000 represents 
17% of his average annual salary and bonus, and 6% of his average annual total compensation (including
salary, bonus, options and stock).
The coefficients on the innate control variables in equation (1) are all reliably different from zero 
(at the 0.001 level) in the predicted directions. Results for the control variables in equation (2) are 
generally consistent with prior research, although the significance levels of many of the variables are low.
We note, however, that most prior research does not include price sensitivity in examining the 
12 In the presence of multi-collinearity, point estimates are still unbiased and consistent, and standard errors are still 
correctly estimated (though they may be large).  The problem with multi-collinearity is that it may be hard to get
coefficient estimates that are statistically significant.  But as our results show, we find highly significant t-statistics 
for both of the sensitivity measures. Given that the presence of multi-collinearity can not lead to over-stated
significance levels (only under-stated), our findings, if anything, understate the importance of the two sensitivities in
explaining variation in accruals quality.
20determinants of risk sensitivity.  In the Panel B tests which exclude price sensitivity, we find, for
example, the predicted relations between RiskSens and firm size (positive, t-statistic = 27.84), volatility
(positive, t-statistic = 6.34), investment opportunity set (positive, t-statistic = 8.05), and regulatory status 
(negative, t-statistic = –7.99). 
Overall, we interpret the results in Table 2 as indicating that poorer accruals quality is associated
with greater ESO sensitivity to returns volatility and with less ESO sensitivity to share price.  We also 
find that arrangements, such as direct shareholdings, that provide managers with incentives to increase 
rather than decrease accruals quality are associated with better accruals quality. Finally, we note that the 
results show no indication of a governance response (either to increase or reduce risk sensitivity in 
response to changes in accruals quality).
4.2. Tests of option usage measures
Our tests based on option usage measures estimate equations (3) and (4a, 4b, 4c) as a 2SLS 
system of equations.  Because the option usage measures are bounded below by zero (firms cannot issue 
negative amounts of these instruments) and because of the large percentage of sample firms that report 
zero values for ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage, we estimate equations (4a)-(4c) as Tobit models in 
the first stage of the 2SLS procedure.  Results, reported in Table 3, panel A, indicate that most of the test 
variables are endogeneous, with p-values for the Hausman tests of 0.0235 or less, except for the
convertible debt regression where accruals quality is not found to be endogenous (p-value=0.2084).
Consistent with H1a, the main results show a reliably positive association between AQ and ESO
Usage in equation (3) ( 1 0.5179 J   , t-statistic = 11.80).  This result means that, controlling for factors 
known to influence innate accruals quality, greater use of ESOs is associated with reporting choices that 
decrease accruals quality. Turning to tests of H1b, the coefficient on AQ in equation (4a) is reliably
negative ( 1 0.3368 I   , t-statistic = -3.53).  This result, which suggests less use of ESOs when accruals 
quality is poor, is consistent with an evaluation risk argument that poorer accruals quality leads boards of 
directors to reduce use of ESOs. 
21When call options are used for financing we predict either no relation between accruals quality 
and the use of convertible instruments, or one where the use of these instruments is associated with better 
accruals quality.  The results are consistent with the latter relation.  Specifically, the negative point 
estimates on ConvDebt Usage ( 2 0.2275 J   , t-statistic = -2.10) and ConvPref Usage ( 3 0.1767 J   , t-
statistic = -2.93) indicate that greater use of these instruments is associated with better accruals quality.
For both instruments, tests of H1b reveal significantly positive governance responses as modeled by
equations (4b) and (4c): for ConvDebt Usage the point estimate is U1= 0.1296 (t-statistic = 2.25) and for 
ConvPref Usage the point estimate is T1= 0.2541 (t-statistic = 5.03).  These results suggest that better 
accruals quality is associated with greater use of convertible debt and convertible preferred stock.
13
Other variables in the equations generally enter with the predicted signs or are insignificant at 
conventional levels.  On the whole, our findings concerning the determinants of ESO (equation 4a) use 
are similar to those reported by prior studies.
14  In the convertible instrument regressions (equations 4b 
and 4c), the signs of the coefficients on the control variables are similar to those found for the ESO usage 
regression.  Finally, the control variables in equation (3) also generally have the predicted signs.
15
The results in panel A of Table 3 are predicated on a link, demonstrated in prior research and 
verified in section 3.3 for our samples, that deterioration in AQ leads to higher returns volatility.  In our
next test, we probe the implications of cross-sectional variation in the strength of the AQ-returns volatility
link.  Specifically, we expect firms whose stock return volatility is more (less) sensitive to accruals 
quality to have a higher (lower) accruals quality response to ESO Usage.  We measure the firm-specific
13 The coefficients on ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage, are statistically indistinguishable from each other,
suggesting that these instruments have similar effects on accruals quality.
14 In particular, in regressions including all control variables, Dechow et al. find significant positive associations
between ESO Usage and R&D (their proxy for investment opportunities), returns variability, and tax status; and they
find significant negative associations between ESO Usage and regulatory status and firm size.  They find a 
significant negative association between ESO Usage and dividend constraints (inconsistent with their predictions);
in contrast, we find a significant positive relation between these variables.
15 The exception is the positive relation between AQ and firm size, which contrasts with prior research, e.g., Dechow
and Dichev [2002], which finds that poor accruals quality is negatively associated with firm size.  We ascribe this
conditional positive association to the presence of additional, correlated variables in our regressions (such as ESO
Usage, ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage). As a check, we estimated a regression of AQ on just the innate
factors; results show the expected positive signs with the volatility of cash flows and sales, operating cycle and
negative earnings realizations, and the expected negative (and significant) association with firm size. 
22strength of the association between returns volatility and accruals quality as the Spearman correlation (Uj)
between firm j’s monthly volatility of returns and the monthly returns to an accrual quality factor 
mimicking portfolio (AQfactor), constructed as in Francis et al. [2005].
16  We re-estimate equations (3) 
and (4a) adding j j ESO U u  to equation (3) and j j AQ U u  to equation (4a).
17  Results, reported in panel B
of Table 3, show the expected positive coefficient on the  j j ESO U u  interaction term (t-statistic = 3.82).
The significance level on the main ESO Usage variable, as well as on the exogenous variables, are similar
to those reported in panel A.  We find no significant coefficient on the j j AQ U u  term in equation (4a).
Based on these results, we conclude that the more important is accruals quality for returns volatility, the 
more ESO use influences discretionary accruals quality.
4.3. Sensitivity tests
In addition to the tests described previously, we performed several robustness checks.  First, we 
assess the sensitivity of all results to industry effects by including industry dummies (based on Fama-
French’s [1997] 17-industry code classification) as control variables in all equations.  While the industry
variables themselves are in a few cases reliably different from zero, their inclusion has no effect on the 
main results, and the effect on explanatory power is miniscule.
Second, to mitigate concerns that the significant positive relation found between AQ and each 
ESO construct (RiskSens and ESO Usage) is driven by potential incompleteness of the set of Innate(k)
factors, we performed two additional tests.  In the first, we investigate whether our results are due to the 
possibility that the innate factors capture less variation in AQ in settings where greater sensitivity or use 
of ESOs is expected.  Our tests of this conjecture compare the ability of Innate(k) to explain AQ between 
high versus low tech industries (as defined by Francis and Schipper [1999]), and across portfolio deciles 
16 Briefly, in calendar month m, the AQ-portfolio is long in the 40 percent of firms with the poorest AQ and short in 
the 40 percent of firms with the best AQ. AQfactor is the return of this portfolio in month m, and is a returns-based
representation of AQ.  Returns-based representations of underlying factors have been validated in numerous research
settings (e.g., Fama and French [1993] examine size and book to market, Carhart [1997] examines price momentum,
and Francis et al. [2005] use and validate AQfactor).
17 We do not include equations (4b) and (4c), or include ConvDebt Usage or ConvPref Usage in (3), because we
have no reason to believe that either of these convertible instruments is affected by variation in the strength of the
relation between accruals quality and returns volatility.
23formed by ranking firms based on R&D spending, book-to-market ratios, and, separately, on each of the 
ESO constructs (RiskSens and ESO Usage).  In no case do we find meaningful differences or any 
systematic pattern in the explanatory power of Innate(k) across the partitions.  In the second test, we 
expand the set of innate factors to include variables that might plausibly be related to the ESO constructs: 
book-to-market ratio and R&D spending as a percentage of total assets.  Results show that neither
variable is significant in explaining AQ, nor does the inclusion of these variables affect the previously
documented results. 
We also believe that our findings concerning the accruals quality effects of managerial
shareholdings and convertible financing arrangements provide additional evidence that Innate(k) is not 
mis-specified in some important way.  In particular, for an omitted Innate(k) variable to explain the 
poorer accruals quality effects found for ESO sensitivity and ESO usage, it would also have to explain the 
better accruals quality effects found for managerial holdings and for convertible debt and convertible 
preferred stock.  We can think of no variable which would have such a different influence on ESOs than it 
would have on these other variables. 
Our third sensitivity test replaces AQ with a measure of discretionary accruals quality, DiscAQ,
formed by orthogonalizing AQ with respect to its innate factors. Results pertaining to hypotheses H1a are
similar using DiscAQ: greater ESO returns sensitivity and greater ESO usage is associated with poorer 
discretionary accruals quality while greater use of ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage is associated
with better discretionary accruals quality (p-values are 0.05 or better).  However, because of the low 
explanatory power of the first stage regression, the instrument for DiscAQ used in the second stage
regression is quite noisy; not surprisingly, we find no significant coefficients on DiscAQ (our tests of 
H1b) in any of the governance response regressions.
18 Since a well-specified first-stage regression is 
crucial for interpreting results of a system of equations such as those we estimate, we have more
18 If the first-stage R
2 is low, the first-stage estimates will be noisy and will be poor proxies for the dependent
variables they replace in the second-stage regression (Gujarati [1988]). 
24confidence in results that use AQ as the measure of accruals quality and condition on innate factors 
influencing accruals quality. 
Finally, we note that the Tobit analyses used in the option usage regressions do not produce
comparable goodness-of-fit statistics.  As Veall and Zimmerman [1994] discuss, there are several, largely
ad hoc, goodness-of-fit measures, but none of them has the properties of an OLS R
2.  Along these lines, 
we provide informal evidence on the strength of the associations for equations (4a), (4b) and (4c) by
documenting the Pearson correlations between the predicted Tobit values for each dependent variable and
the corresponding actual values.  The correlations are 0.33, 0.16 and 0.32 for ESO Usage, ConvDebt
Usage, and ConvPref Usage, respectively.  Based on the results in Veall and Zimmerman, these 
correlations likely understate the underlying OLS R
2 by a factor of about two; even with such an
adjustment, however, these associations are low enough to raise the concern that the predicted values of 
the usage measures in equation (3) are weak instruments.  As a sensitivity analysis, we re-estimate 
equation (3) as an OLS regression, using the actual values of ESO Usage, ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref
Usage.  While weak instruments are not allowed to influence the OLS analysis, this approach ignores
simultaneity, and thus runs the risk of misspecification.  The results (not tabulated) show that ESO Usage
continues to be significantly positively associated with accruals quality (t-statistic = 2.97), whereas 
ConvDebt Usage and ConvPref Usage are not significant.  We interpret this evidence as indicating that 
our main result concerning ESO usage and accruals quality is robust, and our result concerning 
convertible instrument usage and accruals quality is sensitive to specification choices. 
4.4. Estimated cost to the firm of the AQ effects of ESOs
Both the ESO sensitivity tests and the option usage tests point to ESOs having a net effect of 
worsening accruals quality.  From the firm’s perspective, this reduction of accruals quality is manifest in a 
higher cost of capital.  For the ESO sensitivity tests, our analysis in section 4.1 showed that the net effect 
of ESOs was to worsen accruals quality by about 0.0060, or roughly one AQ decile.  Given Francis et al.’s
[2004, table 5, panel C] finding that moving one AQ decile corresponds to about 29 basis points in cost of 
25capital terms, we estimate that the average firm in the ESO sensitivity sample pays a cost of capital
premium of about 29 basis points for the accruals quality effects of ESOs. 
The preceding analysis likely understates the effect of ESOs because RiskSens is based on the 
average top five executives’ ESO portfolios, not the portfolio of ESOs for all employees of the firm.  To 
gauge the cost of capital effect if a measure of total firm ESOs is used, we turn to the ESO usage tests, 
where the usage measure represents firm-wide ESOs.  In Table 3, Panel A, we see that one unit of ESO
Usage corresponds to a 0.5179 effect on AQ.  From Table 1, Panel B we know that the average value of 
ESO Usage in our sample is 0.0851.  Multiplying the two figures gives the average AQ effect of ESO
Usage in our sample, or 0.0441.  Using the conversion of 0.0061 per AQ decile, this figure corresponds to 
an average cost of capital effect of about 210 basis points (0.0441 divided by 0.0061 = 7.3 decile effect, 
multiplied by 29 basis points per decile).
We emphasize that the 29-210 basis point range indicated by these calculations is likely a noisy
estimate of the cost of capital effects.  These estimates do show, however, that the AQ-related effects of 
ESOs are non-trivial, even if one restricts attention to the cost of capital effects associated with the ESOs 
given to the top five executives only.  It is also worth noting that these cost of capital effects do not imply
that firms lose economic value because of ESOs: there may very well be (and presumably are) increased 
profits that more than offset the higher cost of capital effects.  On this point, we note that Hanlon et al. 
show some evidence of increased operating income associated with ESOs.
5. Summary and Conclusion 
We hypothesize that the use of call options in both compensation and financing arrangements is 
associated with discernible effects on financial reporting quality. We find that managers trade off 
incentives for both poorer and better accruals quality, and that the overall financial reporting outcome of 
using call options in compensation arrangements is a decrease in accruals quality, while the overall 
financial reporting effect of using call options in financing arrangements is an increase in accruals quality.
While our primary goal is to investigate the financial reporting effects of using call options in these two 
26settings, we also comment on the governance responses to these financial reporting outcomes.
Specifically, we show that overall lower accruals quality generally elicits decreased use of call options in 
compensation arrangements; in contrast, we generally find increased use of convertible instruments in 
response to better accruals quality.
These results contribute to at least two literatures.  First is the literature examining the 
consequences of using ESOs in compensation arrangements.  For example, DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn
[1990] find that stock return volatility (as well as the volatility of earnings-based performance measures)
increases significantly following announcements of ESO plans, and both Guay [1999] and Cohen, Hall 
and Viceria [2000] document significant positive associations between ESO incentives and returns 
volatility.  Our finding of a positive association between accruals quality and both ESO usage and ESO 
sensitivity suggests one mechanism through which the increased returns volatility found by these studies 
comes about: by managers engaging in reporting behaviors that reduce accruals quality and thereby
increase returns volatility. Second is the body of work which points to non-benign effects of ESOs on 
financial reporting outcomes.  Research here shows that firms with higher levels of ESOs have a higher 
incidence of shareholder litigation (Peng and Roell [2003]), restatements (Burns and Kedia [2003]), and 
SEC enforcement actions (Johnson, Ryan and Tian [2003]).  Other studies show that greater use of 
equity-based incentives (especially ESOs) encourages managers to manipulate earnings (see, for example,
Bartov and Mohanram [2004], Ke [2004], and Cohen, Dey and Lys [2004]).  Our findings suggest an 
additional consequence of ESOs – higher costs of capital – deriving from returns-volatility incentives of 
managers to choose reporting decisions which worsen accruals quality.
27Table 1
Descriptive Information On the Variables Used in the Option Risk Sensitivity and Call Option Usage Tests
Panel A: Descriptive data on variables used in the option risk sensitivity tests
a
Variable mean std dev. 10% 25% median 75% 90%
RiskSens 0.0293 0.0414 0.0027 0.0062 0.0145 0.0324 0.0724
AQ 0.0177 0.0163 0.0041 0.0071 0.0132 0.0225 0.0375
PriceSens 0.0655 0.1048 0.0042 0.0123 0.0282 0.0666 0.1597
log(PriceSens) -3.5590 1.3769 -5.3190 -4.3440 -3.5465 -2.6875 -1.8157
MgrlHoldings 39.5091 555.1882 0.3936 0.7909 2.1107 6.5107 27.5335
log(MgrlHoldings) 1.5024 1.2884 0.3319 0.5827 1.1349 2.0163 3.3511
Volatility 0.4618 0.1855 0.2619 0.3152 0.4222 0.5811 0.7266
IOS -0.0020 0.0022 -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0024 -0.0011 0.0006
FCF 0.0088 0.1012 -0.0698 -0.0199 0.0188 0.0538 0.0900
DivConstraint 0.2865 0.3223 0.0000 0.0000 0.1818 0.5455 0.8182
Tax 0.2222 0.3307 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3636 0.8182
Regulated 0.0980 0.2971 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
V(CFO) 0.0806 0.0645 0.0264 0.0402 0.0642 0.0964 0.1553
V(Sales) 0.2385 0.1919 0.0746 0.1185 0.1852 0.3031 0.4507
log(Assets) 6.7800 1.5685 4.8970 5.6448 6.6261 7.8700 8.9931
log(OperCycle) 4.4879 1.4606 3.8332 4.2288 4.6409 5.0024 5.3010
NegEarn 0.1673 0.2125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0909 0.2727 0.4545
Panel B: Descriptive data on variables used in the call option usage tests
b
Test variables: mean std dev. 10% 25% median 75% 90%
ESO Usage 0.0851 0.0720 0.0076 0.0341 0.0697 0.1179 0.1765
ConvDebt Usage 0.0239 0.0602 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0141 0.0783
ConvPref Usage 0.0210 0.0638 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0615
AQ 0.0346 0.0353 0.0074 0.0123 0.0225 0.0444 0.0756
Control variables:
Volatility 0.6196 0.3307 0.2756 0.3564 0.5515 0.7986 1.0551
IOS -0.0044 0.0713 -0.0268 -0.0244 -0.0197 -0.0036 0.0297
FCF -0.0989 1.0113 -0.2166 -0.0810 -0.0218 0.0182 0.0560
DivConstraint 0.4511 0.3573 0.0000 0.0833 0.4495 0.7500 1.0000
Tax 0.3201 0.3417 0.0000 0.0000 0.2000 0.5833 0.8889
Regulated 0.0253 0.1567 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
V(CFO) 0.1309 0.1126 0.0375 0.0578 0.0960 0.1613 0.2637
V(Sales) 0.3104 0.2651 0.0891 0.1410 0.2393 0.3854 0.6157
log(Assets) 4.2599 2.2618 1.4010 2.6162 4.0834 5.6822 7.3888
log(OperCycle) 4.7126 1.3607 3.9148 4.4393 4.8645 5.2215 5.5348
NegEarn 0.3166 0.2948 0.0000 0.0833 0.2500 0.5000 0.7500
Variable definitions: RiskSens = the average sensitivity of the firm’s ESO grants (to the top five
executives) to returns volatility; PriceSens = the average sensitivity of the firm’s ESO grants (to the top 
five executives) to stock price; MgrlHoldings = the ratio of the market value of the top five executives 
shareholdings to their average yearly total compensation; ESO Usage = the number of common shares 
reserved for conversion of employee stock options, divided by total common shares outstanding;
ConvDebt Usage =  the number of common shares reserved for conversion of convertible debt, divided by
total common shares outstanding; ConvPref Usage =  the number of common shares reserved for 
28conversion of preferred stock, divided by total common shares outstanding; AQ = measure of the firm’s
accruals quality, equal to the standard deviation of the residuals from firm-specific regressions of current 
accruals on current, future and lagged cash flows, change in revenues and PPE; Volatility = annualized 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns; IOS = measure of the firm’s investment opportunity
set, equal to the common factor obtained from a factor analysis of research and development expense,
book to market ratio, and capital expenditures as a percentage of the firm’s assets; FCF = measure of the 
firm’s free cash flows, equal to the sum of cash from operations and cash from investment, scaled by total 
assets; DivConstraint = measure of the firm’s closeness to dividend constraints, equal to 1 if the ratio 
(retained earnings plus cash dividends and stock repurchases)/(cash dividends plus stock repurchases) is 
less than two, zero otherwise; Tax = 1 if the firm has net operating loss carry forwards, zero otherwise; 
Regulated = 1 if the firm operates in a regulated industry (SIC codes 49, 60, 62, 64-67), zero otherwise; 
log(Assets) = log of total assets, our measure of firm size; ( ) CFO V  = standard deviation of the firm’s
cash flow from operations;  ( ) Sales V = standard deviation of sales revenues;   = log of the
length of the firm’s operating cycle, measured as the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory;
and
log( ) OperCycle
NegEarn = incidence of negative earnings realizations. 
a Panel A reports summary information on the test and control variables for the 1,182 firms used in the 
option risk sensitivity tests.  These data are from Execucomp and cover the period 1992-2002.
b Panel B reports summary information on the test and control variables for the 3,322 firms used in the 
option usage tests.  These data are from Compustat and cover the period 1984-1995.
.
29Table 2
Tests of the Relation Between Option Risk Sensitivity, Option Price Sensitivity and Accruals Quality
a
Panel A: Tests including price sensitivity measure
AQ regression RiskSens Regression
Endogenous variables: Pred.Sign coef. est. t-stat. Pred.Sign coef. est. t-stat.
RiskSens +0 . 7 4 4 2 6 . 0 2 - - - -
AQ -- --  - 0.1599 1.46
Exogenous variables:
V(CFO) +0 . 0 5 8 3 8 . 0 8 - - - -
V(Sales) +0 . 0 1 1 4 6 . 5 4 - - - -
log (Assets)  - -0.0065 -7.74 + 0.0074 13.61
log (OperCycle) +0 . 0 0 0 8 3 . 9 1 - - - -
NegEarn +0 . 0 1 2 8 7 . 3 6 - - - -
log(MgrlHoldings) - -0.0006 -2.47 -- --
log(PriceSens) - -0.0096 -5.21 0.0143 26.95
Volatility -- -- + 0.0074 1.21
IOS -- -- + 0.2416 0.76
FCF -- --  - 0.0136 1.73
DivConstraint -- -- + -0.0052 -2.45
Tax -- -- + -0.0018 -1.02
Regulated -- -- - -0.0034 -1.59
Adjusted R
2 0.4353 0.6605
p-value Hausman test 0.0000 0.8523
First-stage R
2 0.4487 0.6575
Panel B: Tests excluding price sensitivity measure
AQ regression RiskSens Regression
Endogenous variables: Pred.Sign coef. est. t-stat. Pred.Sign coef. est. t-stat.
RiskSens +0 . 2 0 5 5 7 . 9 3 - - - -
AQ --  - -0.0683 -0.49
Exogenous variables:
V(CFO) +0 . 0 6 0 5 8 . 3 5 - - - -
V(Sales) +0 . 0 0 8 1 5 . 0 0 - - - -
log (Assets)  - -0.0036 -9.41 + 0.0157 27.84
log (OperCycle) +0 . 0 0 1 1 5 . 6 2 - - - -
NegEarn +0 . 0 1 4 2 8 . 1 3 - - - -
log(MgrlHoldings) - -0.0005 -2.43 -- --
Volatility -- -- + 0.0482 6.34
IOS -- -- + 3.1885 8.05
FCF -- --  - 0.0815 7.98
DivConstraint -- -- + -0.0001 -0.05
Tax -- -- + -0.0019 -0.85
Regulated -- -- - -0.0204 -7.99
Adjusted R
2 0.4360 0.4596
30Sample description and variable definitions: The sample used in the tests in this table is the ESO risk 
sensitivity sample (N=1,181 firms for the period 1992-2002) described in Panel A, Table 1. See Table 1 
for variable definitions. 
a Panel A reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the 2SLS estimation of equations (1) and (2). 
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